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  1Abstract 
 
Poland’s post-communist economic performance has been generally good.  However, 
for many years its growth was jobless, it exhibited very high unemployment rates and 
concomitantly made little progress in approaching the targets set for EU Member 
States under the Lisbon Strategy.  Unexpectedly, in 2003 the country’s labour market 
began to exhibit a new dynamism, with employment growing strongly and 
unemployment tumbling.  This apparent improvement coincided with a liberalisation 
of its Labour Code.  Unfortunately, the measures introduced to increase flexibility are 
seemingly at variance with the EU’s Fixed-Term Work Directive and might need to 
be modified. 
  21. INTRODUCTION 
Notwithstanding its sluggish performance in 2001-2002, Poland has generally 
delivered annual economic growth rates since 1992 that have been impressive in the 
context of the current European Union of 27 Member States (EU-27).  Indeed, it was 
the first of the Central and Eastern European (CEE) transition economies to witness 
its gross national output (GDP) rise above its 1989 level and it remains a regional 
leader under this metric.  Although simultaneously beset by various persistent 
problems, including high unemployment, delayed privatisation and excessive budget 
deficits, such achievements were to attract epithets such as “East European Tiger” and 
“Soaring Eagle” (de Broeck and Koen, 2000). 
 
Although the country’s EU accession negotiations were not without difficulties on 
various fronts (Blazyca, 2002), the economic progress achieved was certainly a major 
factor contributing to the country’s inclusion in the first wave of post-communist EU 
enlargements in 2004.  Nevertheless, the entry of these low income states brought into 
sharp relief the tensions between the enlargement project and various other ambitions 
of the Union, including the wide-ranging Lisbon Agenda (Ingham and Ingham, 2003).  
For example, while Lisbon was “designed to enable the Union to regain the conditions 
for full employment” (EC, 2000), Poland’s notable economic advances had been 
jobless and, at the point of entry, the country had an unemployment rate of 19.4%, the 
highest in the newly created EU-25.  This might be contrasted with the rate of 7.9% 
that prevailed at the time across the previous EU-15 (Haröarson and Romans, 2005: 
9).  However, to the surprise of policymakers (E. Comm., 2004, 2005, 2006; MRD, 
2007), the Polish labour market had actually entered an era in which it would 
experience a remarkable reversal of fortune.  In particular, between 2003 and 2007, a 
  3net total of over 1.6 million people entered employment and the unemployment rate 
fell to under 10%.
1 
 
It is the aim of this paper to highlight some of the major factors that would appear to 
have stimulated these developments and to identify the broad characteristics of the 
beneficiaries of the recent labour market upturn.  The next section provides a brief 
economic background.  Attention turns specifically to the labour market over the 
years between 1992, when the Polish Labour Force Survey (LFS) was launched, and 
2007 in Section 3.  That discussion is cast in the framework of the various important 
policy initiatives launched by the EU during that period.  This is followed in Section 4 
by a focus on the nature of the changes that occurred between 2003 and 2007; from 
which it transpires that, while the observed employment growth was distributed 
reasonably evenly across labour market groups, it was composed in large part of 
temporary jobs.  However, the legislative reform that would appear to have stimulated 
the explosion in such work is probably at variance with prevailing EU regulations, as 
detailed in Section 5.  As such, Section 6 reviews the groups that might be risk, if the 
Commission were to force a revision of this aspect of Poland’s labour law.  Section 7 
concludes. 
 
2.  POLAND’S ECONOMIC TRANSITION IN COMPARATIVE 
 PERSPECTIVE 
 
At the onset of transition in 1989 Poland had by far the largest economy among those 
countries in CEE embarking more or less simultaneously on the same journey from 
communist hegemony.  However, its living standards were considerably lower than 
those of several of its neighbours, including Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary and 
  4Slovenia (Fischer and Sahay, 2000).  Indeed, many of its initial conditions, including 
a huge monetary overhang, massive foreign debts, chronic shortages and a state 
budget in a critical situation, were most unfavourable (Balcerowicz et al., 1997; 
Krajewska, 1996).  Consequently, early prognoses of Poland’s short to medium-term 
economic future were often pessimistic (Wellisz, 1991) and, in conjunction with what 
some saw as policy errors, worse than those for regional comparators (Winiecki, 
1992). 
 
In the event, as highlighted in Table 1, subsequent events were rather more benign 
than some had feared.  In particular, Poland’s transition induced recession was 
shallower and shorter than those experienced in other CEE countries and its 1989 real 
income level was surpassed more quickly than elsewhere.  IMF economists have 
dated the latter event at 1995 (Berengaut and Elborgh-Woytek, 2005), although 
alternative data suggest that this could actually have occurred in 1994 (de Broeck and 
Koen, op. cit.).  Poland exhibited remarkable resilience in the face of the Russian 
financial crisis of 1998-1999 and the associated loss of markets to the east.  However, 
it suffered a sharp slowdown in 2001 and 2002, which, while reflecting a global 
economic reversal, has also been attributed to a combination of domestic factors, 
including a reduction in investment expenditure and excessively tight macroeconomic 
policies (E. Comm, 2002: 36).  The set back was though relatively short-lived and 
growth rebounded to almost 4% in 2003, buoyed by the increase in exports stimulated 
by a depreciation of the złoty. 
 
TABLE 1 HERE 
 
  5Nevertheless, even though Poland recorded the highest average growth rate of GDP 
over the whole period under examination, other CEE-10 states often recorded stronger 
performances in individual years or sub-periods, as summarised in Table 2.  To some 
extent, however, this was the result of the depth and persistence of the initial 
transition recessions in these other countries; most notably perhaps in the Baltic 
States.  Unsurprisingly, the Polish record looks even more impressive in the context 
of the EU-15.  Even so, individual old Member States have in some years out-
performed Poland and, in the case of Ireland, its average growth rate over the years 
1992-2007 was 7.4%, as opposed to the figure of 4.6% achieved by Poland. 
 
TABLE 2 HERE 
 
The prospect of EU membership for the CEE transition countries was an important 
weapon in the fight not only to embed irrevocably a democratic polity, but also to 
secure a standard of living for their citizens more akin to that enjoyed in Western 
Europe.  The latter is often measured, albeit imperfectly (Layard, 2005; Sen, 1987), 
by GDP per capita.  Although this typically mirrors the behaviour of aggregate output, 
given the relatively slow evolution of populations, it is instructive to highlight 
explicitly what the growth in the Polish economy has implied in this regard.  Data 
from the European Commission’s statistical arm (Eurostat) indicate that real GDP per 
head, measured in Euro terms, increased from 18% of the EU-15 average in 1995 to 
25% in 2007 or from 37 to 48% if measured in purchasing power standards (PPS).  
Even if these observed rates of convergence were to be maintained into the future, it 
would take another 50 years for Polish living standards to attain the norm of the EU-
15 in the former case or 33 years in the latter.  At the same time, it might be noted that 
  6the country’s performance was not sufficiently good, given its initial deficit, to 
improve its standing on these scores amongst the CEE-10.  Indeed, its standard of 
living in PPS now exceeds only that of Bulgaria within the EU-27, having fallen 
below that of the three Baltic States in recent years. 
 
Even so, the advances made by Poland and its fellow transition states have been 
substantial and evidently more durable than envisaged by those who held that the 
imposition of market discipline on formerly socialist societies was doomed to be a 
lengthy process subject to periodic reversals.  Reassuring as this might be, it is 
important to appreciate a little more about the forces underlying the improvements, if 
a firmer understanding of their implications is to be attained.  Here attention is 
focused on developments in labour productivity as a prime mover in the evolution of 
the living standards of a nation.
2  The two most frequently encountered measures of 
this are labour productivity per hour worked and per worker, with the former being 
preferable insofar as it controls for variations in the length of the working week. 
 
Whatever their respective merits, Table 3 provides a comparison of the annual growth 
in these two variables for Poland and the old EU-15 from the middle of the last 
decade through to 2007.  The Polish performance is clearly strong, although one of 
the failings of the socialist economies was their inefficient use of labour and such 
differential movements in worker efficiency, at least in the early transition years, are 
to be expected.  However, developments in labour productivity can have ambiguous 
implications and, notwithstanding their popularity, they must be interpreted with 
caution. 
 
  7TABLE 3 HERE 
 
Put most simply, a given increase in labour productivity can come about from either 
the same output being produced from less labour or from the same amount of labour 
generating a greater level of output.  Of course, both of these tendencies can be 
operating at any point in time but, to the extent that the former influence is dominant, 
there will be a tendency for the level of employment to fall.  With this in mind, the 
intention is to examine some of the more important developments in the Polish labour 
market during the post-communist era, beginning in the next section with an overview 
of the behaviour of certain critical indicators over the years between 1992 and 2007. 
 
3. POLAND’S  LABOUR  MARKET 1992-2007 AND EU POLICY 
 EVOLUTION 
 
While official statistics reported a loss of over 2.3 million jobs between 1989 and 
1992 (GUS, 1997: 217), attention here will focus on data from the Polish LFS that 
commenced in the later year in order to ensure consistency with the remainder of the 
paper.  Figure 1 presents annual average employment data for the years to 2007.  
Following an initial recovery between 1994 and 1998, employment crashed in the 
years to 2003 by over 1.7 million, notwithstanding the generally impressive economic 
performance highlighted above.  Equally, if not more startling, however, was the 
upturn subsequently experienced to 2007, during which time there was no appreciable 
increase in the rate of expansion of the economy.  Before examining the factors that 
might have underpinned this recovery, it is instructive first to explore some of the 
symptoms of the period of job loss and how they compromised Poland’s position in 
relation to prevailing EU policy. 
  8FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
Unless coinciding with a radical decline in population, whether through mortality or 
emigration, of a size that did not occur in Poland, the employment losses after 1998 
must translate into adverse values of other labour market ratios that have increasingly 
been the focus of EU attention over the past twenty years.
3  Table 4 provides 
information on those to be considered here and serves to highlight the conflicts that 
can – and have – existed between the Union’s enlargement ambitions and certain of 
its other aspirations.  First though, it might be noted that, while oddly largely ignored 
in later policy discourse, the EU’s concern about the labour market and its influence 
on wider economic and social indicators can sensibly be dated back to the Delors’ 
White Paper of 1993 (E. Comm, 1993).  This, the author maintained, was inspired 
solely by the issue of unemployment, which had recently risen to around 10% of the 
labour force.  With the prospect of eastern expansion looming larger on the horizon, 
as highlighted by the elaboration of the Copenhagen criteria later that year (EC, 
1993), the level of unemployment in Poland provided an early indication of some of 
the associated concerns that the potential enlargement raised within existing Member 
States. 
 
In 1997, when the European Council endorsed the Commission’s Agenda 2000 
proposals (E. Comm, 1997) at its December Luxembourg Council (EC, 1997) and 
formally opened the door for the accession negotiations to begin, the EU also passed 
the Amsterdam Treaty containing a new Employment Title.  Although the Treaty did 
not formally enter into force until May 1999, the Council proceeded immediately, at 
an Extraordinary Meeting held in Luxembourg in November 1997 (EC, 1997a), to 
  9agree a new European Employment Strategy (EES), as the Treaty required.  This 
represented the first concrete attempt to co-ordinate formally the employment policies 
of Member States.  Its stated purpose was to secure “a significant increase in the 
employment rate in Europe on a lasting basis” (ibid.:3) and to do this through 
convergence towards “jointly set, verifiable, regularly updated targets” (ibid:1).  The 
latter were, however, at this stage confined to inputs rather than outcomes.
4  At the 
time that these ambitions were promulgated, the overall employment rate in the EU of 
those aged 15 to 64, the group in focus, was 60.7%.  A cursory inspection of Table 4 
might suggest that Poland did not seem particularly weak on this score, but the 
trajectory was entirely contrary to the Council’s ambitions. 
 
TABLE 4 HERE 
 
In pursuit of its goals, the Employment Council of 1997 also desired to “turn back the 
tide of unemployment on a lasting basis” (ibid.:2).  At the time, the overall 
unemployment rate prevailing across the EU-15 was 9.8%, little changed from when 
the Delors’ White Paper appeared.  While remaining relatively high, the situation in 
Poland had in fact improved somewhat over those four years.  However, both Delors 
and the EES were concerned not only with the numbers without work, but also with 
their composition.  In particular, both documents placed considerable emphasis on the 
need to reduce youth and long-term unemployment.  Defining youths as those below 
the age of 25, their jobless rate in the EU-15 at the time of the November 
Luxembourg Council was 19.6%.  The situation in Poland was somewhat worse and 
about to deteriorate dramatically, as Table 4 indicates: in the Member States, on the 
other hand, the position was set to improve.  As those out of work for more than 12 
  10months accounted for almost half of the total unemployment pool in the EU-15, this 
actually cast Poland in a rather favourable light in 1997.  Once again though, the 
underlying trends were in opposite directions and the ranking was to be reversed by 
2002. 
 
The next notable milestone in the evolution of EU labour market policy was the 
formulation of the Lisbon Strategy at the Lisbon European Council meeting of March 
2000 (EC, 2000).  This set Europe the strategic goal “to become the most competitive 
and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable 
economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion” (ibid.:2).  
Without exploring all of the complexities of this innovation, it might be noted that it 
ushered in an era of concrete outcome targeting, beginning with those of raising the 
overall employment rate of people aged 15 to 64 from 61 to 70% and that of women 
of the same age from 51 to 60%, both by 2010.  The prevailing figures in Poland were 
then 55 and 48.9%, respectively, with their courses again being in the wrong 
direction.  Following Lisbon, successive Councils advanced the target setting regime.  
Also, the Stockholm Council of March 2001 (EC, 2001) agreed to develop ways and 
means of actively involving the candidate countries in the goals and procedures of the 
Lisbon Strategy.  Simultaneously, in the context of the need to promote active ageing 
in the face of advancing demographic pressures, it called for measures to increase 
labour market participation.  At the time, the activity rate amongst those aged between 
15 and 64 in the EU-15 was some 69.2%, which was rather higher than the downward 
drifting figure to be observed in Poland. 
 
  11The ongoing amendments and refinements to Lisbon, however, proved insufficient to 
prevent the mid-term review of the Strategy from concluding that progress towards its 
goals “has at best been mixed” (E. Comm, 2005a:3).  Without disputing either its 
diagnosis or its remedies, a new start was therefore proposed, focusing efforts around 
the twin tasks of greater growth and more jobs.  This, it was claimed, was the key to 
unlocking the resources needed to meet Lisbon’s wider economic, social and 
environmental ambitions.  Hence was born the Growth and Jobs Strategy, albeit 
typically prefixed by ‘Lisbon’, which integrated the Broad Economic Policy and 
Employment Guidelines into one unified cycle (ibid.; EC, 2005).  Further 
consideration of these developments at this stage would be to stray too far from the 
current purpose, which is to attempt to uncover what lay behind the rather dramatic 
improvements on Poland’s labour market after 2003 that are revealed in Figure 1 and 
Table 4. 
 
4.  2003-2007: TOWARDS A POST-TRANSITION POLISH LABOUR 
 MARKET? 
 
When employment grew by 565,000 in the years from 1995 to 1998, the average rate 
of annual output growth was 6.3%.  However, between the years 2003 and 2007 when 
employment grew by 1,623,000, the average growth rate of GDP was actually 
somewhat lower at 5.1%.  Furthermore, when employment declined by 521,000 
between 1992 and 1994 and by 1,739,000 between 1998 and 2003 the average rates of 
economic growth were 3.9 and 3.0%, respectively.  While by no means conclusive, 
this suggests that growth became radically more employment intensive in the last four 
years under consideration here.  The question, of course, is why? 
 
  12One possibility is that by 2003 Poland had more or less exhausted its potential to 
benefit from technological catch-up and that future growth would therefore need to be 
more factor intensive.  Figures produced by Eurostat on labour productivity per hour 
worked in purchasing power standards, thereby eliminating price level differences 
between countries, effectively dismiss this as an explanation, however, with Poland 
still achieving barely half of the EU-15 standard.
5  Another potential source of rising 
labour usage is a reduction in its price.  One possible indicator of this lies in the 
behaviour of labour costs.  However, while increasing somewhat less rapidly than in 




More plausible, in fact, is to look to the reform of the Labour Code effective from 
2002.  Of most note for current purposes were the changes to the rules governing 
fixed-term employment contracts.  Thus, in 1996, the communist era Labour Code of 
1974 had been amended in an attempt to reduce the widespread use of civil law 
employment contracts, which, in addition to allowing employers to bypass the worker 
security provisions embedded in regular employment contracts, effectively served to 
reduce the government’s tax base as such workers do not have to pay the non-wage 
costs associated with regular employees (Zientara, 2008).
7  At the same time, fixed-
term employment contracts were limited to a maximum duration of three months and 
the agreement of a third such arrangement was presumed to be an open-ended 
contract under the provisions of the Labour Code.
8  Predictably, these moves attracted 
the opposition of employers, particularly in relation to their impact on smaller firms. 
 
  13In the face of a seemingly ever growing pool of unemployment and steered by the 
Minister of Labour and Social Policy, Jerzy Hausner, in 2001 the government 
embarked on a course of introducing greater flexibility into the labour market 
(Czarzasty, 2002).  This culminated in August 2002 with the passage into law of a 
new and more liberal Labour Code.  Not only did this relax certain general obligations 
imposed on employers, it also re-introduced the possibility of employing workers on 
fixed-term contracts without any time limits.  In addition, it established the right for 
firms to engage workers on the basis of ‘substitution agreements’ whereby they cover 
for the justified absence of regular employees; for example, through sickness or 
maternity leave. 
 
The evidence on the composition of the jobs change between 2003 and 2007, 
presented in Table 5, is certainly consistent with the proposition that the legal 
environment in Poland is important.  The central feature of the employment growth 
over the period for present purposes is that 85% of it was composed of temporary 
jobs.  In consequence, fixed-term workers accounted for 28.2% of all employees in 
2007, which means that Poland now has the second highest penetration of such work 
in the EU-27 after Spain.  The significance of this development is perhaps most 
readily appreciated by noting that, ten years previously, less than 5% of Polish 
workers were on temporary contracts, which was lower than in any EU-15 Member 
State. 
 
TABLE 5 HERE 
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become increasingly common to label those employed directly by an organisation on 
non-permanent contracts as fixed-term workers and to reserve the term temporary 
workers for those engaged by the organisation through an intermediary temporary 
work agency (TWA).  Indeed, owing to the general growth in the latter form of 
employment, at least within Europe overall, the two types of worker are now subject 
to distinct strands of legislation, albeit with the same non-discriminatory intent.  More 
concretely, Poland’s legislation governing temporary agency work entered into force 
on 1 January 2004 (Dziennik Ustaw, 2003); however, the EU’s Directive on the 
subject was only passed on 19 November 2008 after many years of debate (OJ, 2008).  
This distinction is not made here for three practical reasons.  First, the Polish LFS did 
not seek to identify the two groups separately prior to 2006.  Second, the data from 
that year onwards indicate that TWA staff accounted for only 1.6 and 1.7% of the 
total number on short-term assignments in 2006 and 2007, respectively.  Third, to 
cover both groups explicitly would place an unacceptable burden on the length of the 
paper.  As such, the terms temporary and fixed-term are here used interchangeably to 
describe those on contracts of finite duration. 
 
Various other aspects of the increase the increase in employment are, however, also 
worthy of note.  First, the fillip benefited both the urban and rural territories of 
Poland.  This must be regarded as a notable achievement given that rural development 
has been a major Achilles heel of the Polish transition (MRD, op. cit.; E. Comm, 
1997a).  Second, the impact was rather stronger for industry than for services, which 
might be regarded as a somewhat unexpected outcome.  In fact, the sum of the 
employment gains in these two broad sectors outweighs the total change recorded 
  15throughout the economy.  This reflects the 10% decline reported over the four years in 
agricultural employment.  While far from sufficient to herald the needed 
modernization of farming (Ingham and Ingham, 2004), it is at least a move in the 
required direction, particularly given the more than offsetting growth in rural 
employment overall.  Third, both males and females saw their situations improve as a 
result of the labour market upturn.  Fourth, all of the gains were recorded in the 
private sector of the economy. 
 
Nevertheless, it should be recognised that the net fall in unemployment was slightly 
greater than the increase in employment, which points to a further small increase in 
the Polish inactivity rate over the period.  This is testimony to the ambitious nature of 
the Lisbon targets insofar as they seek simultaneous improvements on several fronts.  
It is also evident that total employment rose somewhat less than the number of paid 
employees, which stems from decreases in both the numbers of self-employed and of 
unpaid family workers.  The first of these reductions seemingly adds some weight to 
the view that at least some of the increase in self-employment in Europe in recent 
years has been “false”, insofar as it has been the outcome of attempts by erstwhile 
employers to circumvent labour regulations applying to contracted employees (see 
Eyraud and Vaughan-Whitehead, 2007). 
 
Notwithstanding these additional developments, the primary focus remains on the rise 
in temporary employment and attention will now focus on just two of the numerous 
questions that this provokes.  First, whatever the merits or otherwise of increased 
flexibility – it could represent a springboard or a trap for those in temporary jobs 
(Ichino et al., 2008) - is the current situation legally sustainable?  Second, who has 
  16taken these newly created positions and might therefore be affected if their legitimacy 
was challenged? 
 
5.  THE EU DIRECTIVE ON FIXED-TERM WORK: POLAND’S 
 UNDOING? 
 
While the unions were opposed to many of the measures contained within the 
Hausner legislation, what is perhaps more serious is that its temporary contract 
provisions were knowingly in direct contravention of the EU’s 1999 Directive on 
Fixed-Term Work (OJ, 1999) and would need to be amended upon accession.  The 
Directive itself was the result of a framework agreement between the European social 
partners that sought to achieve a better balance between flexibility in working time 
and security for workers, as called for by the EES.  In particular, the legislation 
demanded non-discrimination measures on behalf of temporary employees and 
insisted that Member States introduce one or more of the following in order to prevent 
abuse arising from the use of successive fixed-term employment contracts or 
relationships: 
 
  (a) objective reasons justifying the renewal of such contracts or relationships; 
  (b) the maximum total duration of successive fixed-term employment 
 contracts  or  relationships; 
  (c) the number of renewals of such contracts or relationships. 
 
The problem with the 2002 Polish reforms regarding temporary employment was that 
they effectively permitted such arrangements without restriction.  As such, Poland 
was failing to comply with the acquis communautaire and its Labour Code was 
  17therefore revised again upon accession with the re-introduction of the clause from the 
1996 Code that any third successive fixed-term employment contract with the same 
worker automatically qualifies as an indefinite arrangement.  However, the new law is 
very weak and there are various exceptions to it. 
 
With a view to the exceptions, it should be noted that the Hausner legislation was an 
element of quite a comprehensive package of measures (“Entrepreneurship – 
Development – Work”) attempting to revitalise Poland’s sclerotic labour market.  
Amongst these was the First Job programme for school leavers, later extended to all 
unemployed youths under the age of 25, which included provisions for young people 
to be employed on temporary internships.  While the participants were not covered by 
the provisions of the Labour Code, this situation was not in fact counter to the 1999 
Directive, as elaborated in its Clause 2 covering initial training and publicly supported 
integration initiatives.  In attempting to understand the surge in temporary 
employment, however, First Job, which was never evaluated fully, probably only 
placed around 150,000 young people in temporary posts in each full year of its 
operation and the programme was terminated in December 2005 (Surdej, 2008; 
Czarzasty, 2004).  Notwithstanding the fact that this particular exemption from the 
Labour Code was admissible, various other aspects of the design of the legislation 
almost certainly do violate the precepts of the Directive and have attracted the critical 
attention of the Commission (E. Comm, 2008). 
 
First, the Polish legislation does not provide equal protection for all classes of 
temporary worker.  In particular, it excludes those on contracts for a trial period; those 
employed on substitution contracts and those employed for the performance of 
  18specific work, including seasonal labour.  Second, it is easier in Poland to terminate a 
temporary contract than a permanent one, with the notice period being two weeks in 
the former case and up to three months, depending on length of service, in the latter.  
Third, there are no limits on the possible duration of a fixed-term employment 
contract.  Furthermore, while the Labour Code does state that the maximum number 
of successive temporary contracts that can be concluded between an employer and a 
worker is three, with the third being treated as indefinite; the definition of successive 
is that there be less than one month between them.  The Commission (ibid.) has 
queried whether the latter time limit is long enough.  Fourth, no objective reasons are 
needed to enter into or to renew a fixed-term contract.  It is apparent from the 
language of the report on the transposition of the Fixed-Term Work Directive (ibid.) 
that the laxity of Poland’s efforts in these four areas is unlikely to go unchallenged 
into the future. 
 
6. POLAND’S  TEMPORARY WORKFORCE 
 
The issue of labour market flexibility has a long and contentious history in the social 
sciences.  In more recent times, the topic has become more or less synonymous, in 
one branch of labour economics at least, with that of attempting to identify the 
impacts of employment protection legislation (EPL).  The first problem that must be 
faced in such work is the construction of a measure of the severity of EPL, which is 
not captured by the Eurostat labour cost index discussed above.  Even though it has its 
own shortcomings, the force of such regulation is better gauged by indicators such as 
the EPL index enumerated periodically by the OECD.  In the latest compilation 
(OECD, 2004), Poland was adjudged to have liberal regulations regarding fixed-term 
  19appointments, but relatively severe ones in the case of regular jobs.
9  While variations 
in the strictness of EPL can influence a variety of labour market stocks, flows and 
dynamics, Addison and Teixeira (2003) concluded that, overall and having surveyed a 
large literature, empirical observation points to a net reduction in total employment 
the tighter the rules are.
10   However, they also note that this is an average result and 
that there is considerable evidence pointing to greater impacts for some groups than 
for others.
11  As it might be assumed that a tightening of the terms on which fixed-
term employment contracts can be concluded, as the Commission’s stance implies 
will come to pass, would tend to reduce the extent of temporary working, it is of 
considerable interest to highlight those who might be most strongly affected.
12 
 
In order to identify in any detail the characteristics of those filling Poland’s temporary 
posts, it is necessary to move from the published summary findings of its LFS 
exercises that have formed the basis of the discussion so far to the raw data files that 
underpin them.  For this purpose, it was decided to focus attention on the results for 
the second quarter of each year under study.
13  Table 6, which describes the traits of 
all those observed in fixed-term positions across the five observation points between 
2003 and 2007, expressed in relation to the relevant total, presents the requisite 
information.  In each case, the data are unweighted.  The figures in the second column 
of the Table provide the composition of the fixed-term workforce by characteristics.  
For each sub-aggregate, the figures are exhaustive and sum to 100%.  The figures in 
the third column provide detail on the intensity of temporary working for different 
sections of the labour force; so, for example, 51.1% of all of those aged less than 25 
responding to the Surveys were on fixed-term contracts.  Finally, the fourth column 
  20disaggregates total observed employment, with the figures again being exhaustive, 
save for rounding error, by characteristic vector. 
 
TABLE 6 HERE 
Clearly, many of those in the temporary workforce are below the age of 25, which is 
at least consistent with the emphasis of the First Job initiative and the fact that most of 
its participants took up internships (Surdej, op. cit.).  However, there is no way of 
knowing from the LFS questionnaire that this is actually what the data is picking up.  
Nevertheless, the heavy representation of young people in temporary jobs is a feature 
repeated in other EU Member States (E. Comm, 2007a).  However, it is equally 
important to recognise that, in Poland, three-quarters of those in temporary jobs over 
the period were not eligible to enter the First Job scheme and that such work is of 
some importance for those aged over 24.  The precise nature of their contracts would 
therefore come under scrutiny if the Commission were to require Poland to adhere 
more rigorously to the letter of the Directive.  Somewhat unusually (E. Comm, 
2006a), women neither formed the majority of temporary contract holders and nor 
were they over-represented relative to either their weight in aggregate employment or 
their own presence in the workforce. 
 
It is also rather surprising given the experience in other Member States, both old and 
new, that there is no real educational bias evident amongst the fixed-term staff 
observed by the LFS exercises under scrutiny.  In particular, the differences in the 
likelihood of temporary working between highly and lowly educated workers are not 
of the magnitude typically observed across OECD countries (OECD, 2002).  
However, notwithstanding the growth in temporary working amongst certain 
professional groups, the strongest concentration of temporary workers is to be found 
  21in unskilled occupations.  This is the normal finding (ibid.), but taken in conjunction 
with the outcome for educational groupings, it does point to a concentration of 
workers in jobs for which they are evidently over-qualified. 
 
While by no means absent from the public sector, it is clear that the bulk of temporary 
work is to be found in the private sector of the economy.  It is evident, however, that 
this has very little to do with staffing patterns in agriculture.  While this may seem 
counter-intuitive, given the seasonal character of farming, the exceptionally high 
levels of self-employment and family working, coupled with the obverse paucity of 
paid employees, rationalises the observation.  Although the differences are in general 
not large, it is rare in western economies to observe higher concentrations of 
temporary working in industry rather than services (ibid.).  The contrary finding for 
Poland is perhaps a reflection of its unusual, persistent comparative advantage in 
traditional and low-to-medium skill industries (E. Comm, 2006b). 
 
Poland’s temporary workforce is evidently not only large, but also diverse.  It 
certainly does not appear to accord particularly well with standard portrayals of fixed-
term contract employees as being those at the margins of the labour force, such as 
youths, older people, the poorly qualified and women with intermittent attachment to 
the market.  However, the size and character of the protracted unemployment bulge 
that preceded its emergence was also extraordinary.  At least one segment of the 
country’s labour market now displays the increased flexibility that many saw as a 
precondition for overcoming the problem of more than three million jobless 
individuals and, by 2007, the unemployment rate was in single digits for the first time 
since the LFS began.  A true causal link between the two has not, of course, been 
established, but tightening the regulatory framework would seem to carry with it the 
  22risk of reversal.  As the EU has repeatedly called upon Poland to consolidate its fiscal 
position (e.g. EC, 2007), with reductions in the cost of its inefficient social protection 
system always being to the fore (e.g. E. Comm., 2006b), the danger would then be 
that there will not be the resources available to respond by attempting to substitute an 
alternative approach.  In particular, an imitation of the more comprehensive Danish 
model of flexicurity, which involves relatively liberal EPL, generous unemployment 
benefits and compulsory activation measures, would undoubtedly be too costly at this 
juncture (OECD, 2004; Madsen, 2002).  After all, the First Job initiative was 
abandoned largely on financial grounds (Surdej, 2008). 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
Poland entered its transition epoch as a large, but relatively poor economy.  In its 
quest to ‘return to Europe’, it recorded generally impressive rates of growth although, 
owing to a very low level of labour utilisation, the standard of living of its population 
remained conspicuously low.  As the EU grappled increasingly seriously with the 
problems of improving its competiveness and injecting greater dynamism into its 
labour market, while simultaneously embarked upon an ambitious eastern 
enlargement project, Poland’s weaknesses became ever more evident and 
problematic.  In particular, while these were most evidently manifest by its eventual 
possession of the highest unemployment rate in Europe, they could also be observed 
in its failure to converge towards numerous specific targets of the Lisbon Strategy. 
 
Somewhat unexpectedly, however, the situation on Poland’s labour market began to 
improve dramatically in the years from 2003: unemployment tumbled, the 
employment rate rose and joblessness amongst youths halved.  These improvements 
  23coincided with a relaxation of the country’s employment protection legislation, 
particularly as this relates to fixed-term workers, and the great majority of the new 
posts created between 2003 and 2007 were of a temporary nature.  While the impacts 
of variations in the severity of such laws remain hotly debated on both theoretical and 
empirical grounds, the evidence explored in this paper indicates that Poland’s 
temporary workforce is reasonably diverse in character.  This though is perhaps less 
surprising in a situation in which almost 1.4 million new temporary positions are 
created when one-fifth of the labour force is without work. 
 
The Lisbon Strategy, however, is concerned with much more than the achievement of  
numerical labour market ratios.  For example, it also seeks to increase flexibility 
while simultaneously enhancing worker security.  Unfortunately, Poland’s recently 
liberalised temporary work provisions seem likely to be adjudged to be in breach of 
the EU’s Fixed-Term Directive and will probably require tightening.  If this comes to 
pass, it is possible that, given the country’s difficulties in complying with the Stability 
and Growth Pact and consequent lack of resources for new policy initiatives, the 
question may extend beyond that of whether temporary work provides a stepping 
stone into the world of work or a dead end to one of whether some labour market 
exposure, however tenuous, is better than none at all.
  24REFERENCES 
 
Addison, J. and P. Teixera (2003), ‘The Economics of Employment Protection’, 
Journal of Labor Research, XXIV, 1, pp. 85-129. 
 
Balcerowiz, L., B. Blaszczyk and M. Bobrowski (1997), ‘The Polish Way to the 
Market Economy 1989-1995’, in Woo, W. et al. (eds), (2007). 
 
Bassanini, A. and R. Duval (2006), Employment Patterns in OECD Countries: 
Reassessing the Role of Policies and Institutions, Paris: OECD Economics 
Department Working Paper 486 (Paris: OECD Economics Department). 
 
Berengaut, J. and K. Elborgh-Woytek (2005), Who is Still Haunted by the Specter of 
Communism?  Explaining Relative Output Contractions Under Transition, IMF 
Working Paper 05/68 (Washington: International Monetary Fund). 
 
Blazyca, G. (2002), ‘EU Accession: The Polish Case’, in Ingham, H. and Ingham, M. 
(eds) (2002). 
 
de Broeck, M. and V. Koen (2000), “The Soaring Eagle” – Anatomy of the Polish 
Take-Off in the 1990s, IMF Working Paper 00/06 (Washington: International 
Monetary Fund). 
 
Czarzasty, J. (2004), ‘Youth Employment Measures Assessed’, European Foundation 
for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, EIROnline, PL0410102. 
 
Czarzasty, J. (2002), ‘Amended Labour Code Adopted’, European Foundation for the 
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, EIROnline, PL0209107. 
 
Dziennik Ustaw (Journal of Laws) (2003), ‘The Temporary Employment Agencies 
Act’, No. 166, Item 1608. 
 
E. Comm. (2008), ‘National Legislation Transposing Directive 1999/70/EC on Fixed-
Term Work in the EU 10’, Commission Staff Working Document SEC(2008) 2485 
(Brussels, European Commission). 
 
E. Comm. (2007), ‘Communication From The Commission To The Council, The 
European Parliament, The European Economic And Social Committee And The 
Committee Of The Regions, Stepping up the fight against undeclared work’, 
COM(2007) 628 final (Brussels, European Commission). 
 
E. Comm. (2007a), Employment in Europe 2007, Directorate-General for 
Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities Unit D1 (Brussels, European 
Commission). 
 
E. Comm. (2006), European Economy, no. 2/2006, Directorate-General for Economic 
and Financial Affairs (Brussels, European Commission). 
 
  25E. Comm. (2006a), Employment in Europe 2006, Directorate-General for 
Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities Unit D1 (Brussels, European 
Commission). 
 
E. Comm. (2006b), ‘Country Study: Growth and Competitiveness in the Polish 
Economy: The Road to Real Convergence’ European Economy, Occasional Paper 27, 
Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs (Brussels, European 
Commission). 
 
E. Comm. (2005), European Economy, no. 2/2005, Directorate-General for Economic 
and Financial Affairs (Brussels, European Commission). 
 
E. Comm. (2005a), ‘Working Together for Growth and Jobs: A New Start for the 
Lisbon Strategy’, Communication to the Spring European Council, COM(2005) 24 
final (Brussels, European Commission). 
 
E. Comm. (2004), European Economy, no. 2/2004, Directorate-General for Economic 
and Financial Affairs (Brussels, European Commission). 
 
E. Comm. (2002), ‘2002 Regular Report on Poland’s Progress Towards Accession’, 
COM(2002) 700 final (Brussels, European Commission). 
 
E. Comm. (1997), ‘Agenda 2000 – Volume 1 – Communication: For a Stronger and 
Wider Union’, DOC/97/6 (Brussels, European Commission). 
 
E. Comm. (1997a), ‘Agenda 2000 – Commission Opinion on Poland’s Application for 
Membership of the European Union’ DOC/97/16 (Brussels, European Commission). 
 
E. Comm. (1993), ‘Growth, Competitiveness and Employment: The Challenges and 
Ways Forward into the 21
st Century’, COM(93) 700 final (Brussels, European 
Commission). 
 
EC (2007) ‘Council Recommendation with a view to bringing an end to the situation 
of an excessive government deficit in Poland’, 6533/07 (Brussels, European Council). 
 
EC (2005) ‘Presidency Conclusions Brussels European Council’, 22 and 23 March 
2005 (Brussels, European Council). 
 
EC (2001) ‘Presidency Conclusions Stockholm European Council’, 23 and 24 March 
2001 (Brussels, European Council). 
 
EC (2000) ‘Presidency Conclusions Lisbon European Council’, 23 and 24 March 
2000 (Brussels, European Council). 
 
EC (1997) ‘Presidency Conclusions Luxembourg European Council’, 12 and 13 
December 1997 (Brussels, European Council). 
 
EC (1997a), ‘Extraordinary European Council Meeting on Employment’, 20 and 21 
November (Brussels, European Council). 
 
  26EC (1993) ‘Presidency Conclusions Copenhagen European Council’, 21 and 22 June 
1993 (Brussels, European Council). 
 
Eyraud, E. and Vaughan-Whitehead, D. (eds) (2007), The Evolving World of Work in 
the Enlarged EU: Progress and Vulnerability (Geneva, International Labour Office). 
 
Fischer, S. and R. Sahay (2000), The Transition Economies After Ten Years, IMF 
Working Paper 00/30 (Washington, International Monetary Fund). 
 
GUS (1997), Rocznik Statystyczny Pracy 1997, (Warsaw, Polish Central Statistical 
Office). 
 
Haröarson, Ó and F. Romans (2005) ‘Labour Market Latest Trends – 2nd Quarter 
2004 Data’, Statistics in Focus, Population and Social Conditions, 1/2005 (Brussels, 
Eurostat). 
 
Ichino, A., F. Mealli and T. Nannicini (2008), ‘From Temporary Help Jobs to 
Permanent Employment: What Can We Learn From Matching Estimators and Their 
Sensitivity?’, Journal of Applied Econometrics, 23, 3, pp. 305-327. 
 
Ingham, H. and M. Ingham (2004), ‘How Big is the Problem of Poland’s 
Agriculture?’, Europe-Asia Studies, 56, 2, pp. 213-234. 
 
Ingham, M. and H. Ingham (2003), ‘Enlargement and the European Employment 
Strategy: Turbulent Times Ahead?’, Industrial Relations Journal, 34, 5, pp. 379 – 
395. 
 
Ingham, H. and M. Ingham (eds) (2002), EU Expansion to the East (Cheltenham, 
Edward Elgar). 
 
Krajewska, A. (1996), ‘Transformation of the Polish Economy’, Eastern European 
Economics, 34, 1, pp. 5 – 20. 
 
Layard, R. (2005), Happiness – Lessons from a New Science (London and New York, 
Penguin). 
 
Madsen, P. (2002), ‘The Danish Model of “Flexicurity” – A Paradise with some 
Snakes’, (Dublin, European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working 
Conditions). 
 
MRD (2007), Human Capital Operational Programme: National Strategic Reference 
Framework 2007 – 2013 (Warsaw, Ministry of Regional Development). 
 
OECD (2004), Employment Outlook 2004 (Paris, OECD). 
 
OECD (2002), Employment Outlook 2002 (Paris, OECD). 
 
OECD (2001), Measuring Productivity: Measurement of Aggregate and Industry-
Level Productivity Growth (Paris, OECD). 
 
  27  28
OJ (Official Journal of the European Communities) (2008), ‘Directive 2008/104/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on temporary 
agency work, L 327/9, 5.12.2008. 
 
OJ (Official Journal of the European Communities) (1999), ‘Council Directive 
1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement concluded by 
ETUC, UNICE and CEEP’, L 175/43, 10.7.1999. 
 
Rapacki, R. (2003), ‘Macroeconomic Performance’ in World Economy Research 
Institute, Poland: International Economic Report 2002/2003 (Warsaw: Warsaw 
School of Economics). 
 
Sa, F. (2008), ‘Does Employment Protection Help Immigrants?  Evidence from 
European Labor Markets’, Discussion Paper 3414 (Bonn, IZA). 
 
Sen, A. (1987), The Standard of Living (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press). 
 
Siebert, S. (2007), ‘Labour Market Regulation in the EU-15: Causes and 
Consequences’, in Vaubel, R. and Bernholz, P. (eds) (2002). 
 
Surdej, A. (2008), ‘First Job Programme, Poland’ (Dublin, European Foundation for 
the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions). 
 
Vaubel, R. and P. Bernholz, P. (eds) (2002) Political Competition and Economic 
Regulation (London, Routledge). 
 
Wellisz, S. (1991), ‘Poland Under “Solidarity” Rule’, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 5, 4, pp. 211-217. 
 
Winiecki, J. (1992), ‘The Polish Transition Programme: Underpinnings, Results, 
Interpretations’. Soviet Studies, 44, 5, pp. 809-835. 
 
Woo, W., S. Parker and J. Sachs (eds) (1997), Economies in Transition: Comparing 
Asia and Eastern Europe (Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press). 
 
Zientara, P. (2008), ‘A Report on the Polish Labor Market: An Insider-Outsider 




GDP at constant prices (1989 = 100) 
  BG CZ EE HU LV LT PL RO SK SI 
1989  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1990  90.9 98.8 97.8 96.5 97.7  105.5  92.8 94.4 99.6 92.5 
1991  81.1 87.4 90.0 85.0 85.4 99.5 86.3 82.2 83.8 84.3 
1992  74.3 84.6 70.6 82.4 58.0 78.3 88.1 75.0 78.2 79.6 
1993  65.7 85.0 64.7 81.9 51.4 65.6 91.9 76.1 75.3 81.8 
1994  63.2 87.8 63.6 84.4 52.5 59.2 96.7 79.1 80.0 86.2 
1995  62.2 93.4 66.8 87.3 51.4 59.9  103.2  84.8 84.6 89.7 
1996  57.2 87.2 70.1 88.4 53.4 63.0  109.6  88.1 89.9 93.0 
1997  53.9 96.5 77.7 92.5 57.9 68.3  117.4  82.8 94.0 97.5 
1998  56.1 95.8 81.9 97.0 60.6 73.4  123.2  78.8 98.2  101.3 
1999  57.4  97.1  81.8 101.0 62.6  72.3 128.8 77.9  98.2 106.8 
2000  60.5 100.6 89.6 106.3 66.9  75.3 134.3 79.6  99.6 111.2 
2001  63.0 103.1 96.5 110.6 72.3  80.3 135.9 84.1 102.9  114.7 
2002  65.8 105.0  104.0  115.4 77.0  85.9 137.9 88.4 107.8  118.8 
2003  69.1 108.8  111.4  120.3 82.5  94.7 143.2 93.1 113.0  122.2 
2004  73.7  113.7 119.8 126.0  89.7  101.6 150.8 100.9 118.9 127.6 
2005  78.3  120.9 130.8 131.2  99.2  109.7 156.3 105.1 126.7 132.9 
2006  83.2  129.1 144.3 136.3 111.3 118.3 166.0 113.4 137.5 140.5 
2007  88.3  137.6 153.5 138.1 122.8 128.9 177.1 120.3 151.7 149.0 
Legend: BG = Bulgaria, CZ = Czech Republic, EE = Estonia, HU = Hungary, LV = Latvia, LT = Lithuania, PL = Poland, RO = Romania, SK = 
Slovakia, SI = Slovenia. 
Source: Derived from IMF World Economic Database October 2008, with imputations from Berengaut and Elborgh-Woytek (2005) for Estonia 
and Slovakia (1989 – 1992) and for Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia (1989 – 1991)
  29Table 2 
Average Annual GDP Growth Rates for 1992-2007 and Sub-Periods (%) 
  1992-1996 1997-2001 2002-2007  1992-2007 
Bulgaria -6.7  2.0  5.8  0.7 
Czech  Republic  2.2 1.2 4.9  2.9 
Estonia -4.3  6.6  8.1  3.7 
Hungary  0.8 4.6 3.8  3.1 
Latvia -7.9  6.3  9.2  3.0 
Lithuania -8.2  5.0  8.2  2.1 
Poland  4.9 4.4 4.5  4.6 
Romania 1.6  -0.8  6.1  2.5 
Slovakia  1.6 2.8 6.7  3.7 
Slovenia  2.1 4.3 4.5  3.7 




Annual Growth in Real Labour Productivity (%) 
  Per Hour  Per Worker 
  Poland EU15 Poland EU15 
1994 5.5  2.7
1 n.a. n.a. 
1995 6.7  1.8
1 n.a. n.a. 
1996  4.1 1.4 4.3 1.2 
1997  5.7 2.4 4.4 1.6 
1998  4.9 1.3 3.6 1.2 
1999  8.9 1.4 5.4 1.2 
2000  6.4 2.7 6.8 1.7 
2001  4.1 1.1 4.6 0.5 
2002  4.2 1.6 3.4 0.5 
2003 4.7  1.4  14.2  0.7 
2004  4.0 1.4 4.1 1.5 
2005  0.7 1.2 1.4 0.9 
2006  3.2 1.6 2.9 1.4 
2007  2.6 0.9 2.1 1.0 
Notes: 1. Excludes Austria. 
Sources: productivity per hour from OECD Labour Productivity Growth Database; 
productivity per worker from Eurostat National Accounts Indicators Database. 
 





Source: GUS Labour Force Survey, various years.
Total Employment 1992-2007 (000s) 
Year























1992  13.5 59.9 28.3 32.9 53.1 69.5 
1993  14.0 58.9 30.1 37.7 52.1 68.8 
1994  14.4 58.3 32.6 40.2 51.9 68.4 
1995  13.3 58.1 31.2 40.0 51.8 67.4 
1996  12.4 58.4 28.7 39.1 51.8 66.9 
1997  11.3 58.8 25.0 37.8 51.8 66.5 
1998  10.6 59.0 23.2 37.6 52.2 66.1 
1999  13.9 56.4 31.2 33.1 50.1 65.8 
2000  16.1 55.0 35.2 37.9 48.9 65.8 
2001  18.3 53.5 41.0 43.1 47.8 65.7 
2002  19.9 51.5 43.9 48.4 46.3 64.6 
2003  19.7 51.2 43.2 49.7 46.0 64.0 
2004  19.0 51.7 41.1 48.0 46.2 64.0 
2005  17.8 52.8 38.0 52.2 46.8 64.5 
2006  13.9 54.5 29.8 50.4 48.2 63.4 
2007  9.6  57.0 21.7 45.7 50.6 63.2 
Variable Definitions: Unemployment = % of economically active without work; Employment Rate (15-64) = % of population aged 15-64 in 
work; Unemployment 15-24 (%) = % of economically active population aged 15-24 without work; % Unemployment > 12 Months = % of total 
unemployment pool out of work for more than twelve months; Female Employment Rate (15-64) = % of female population aged 15-64 in work; 
Economic Activity Rate (15-64) = % of population aged 15-64 in labour market (employed + unemployed). 
Sources: Labour Force Survey, Warsaw: GUS, various years; employment and activity rates, Eurostat from 2002 onwards. 
 
  32Table 5 
Employment Changes 2003-2007 
  Change 2003-2007  % Change 2003-2007 
Total Employment  1,624,000  11.9 
Total Unemployment  -1,710,000  -51.4 
Total Employees  1,761,000  17.7 
Urban Employment  1,063,000  12.7 
Rural Employment  561,000  10.7 
Industry Employment  789,000  20.3 
Services Employment  1,092,000  15.1 
Male Employment  971,000  13.1 
Female Employment  653,000  10.6 
Private Sector Employees  1,909,000  34.6 
Public Sector Employees  -147,000  -3.3 
Permanent Employees  389,000  4.9 
Temporary Employees  1,373,000  71.6 

















  33Table 6 
Temporary Workers 2003-2007 




Group as % of 
Total Employed
1 
Age      
15-24 25.8  51.1  9.0 
25-64 73.3  14.8  88.6 
65+ 0.9  7.2  2.3 
Sex      
Male 55.8  18.3  54.4 
Female 44.2  17.3  45.6 
Education       
Tertiary 14.4  14.0  18.4 
Vocational Secondary  27.9  17.2  28.9 
General Secondary  9.9  23.5  7.5 
Basic Vocational  35.2  19.4  32.5 
Lower Secondary or 
Worse 
12.6 17.7  12.7 
Sector
1      
Public 19.5  12.0  40.7 
Private 80.5  33.9  59.3 
Economic Activity       
Agriculture 3.8  3.3  20.7 
Industry 42.4  26.4  28.7 
Services 53.8  19.0  50.5 
Occupation      
Professional 10.2  9.9  18.4 
Skilled/Semi-Skilled 73.0  17.8  73.4 
Unskilled
2  16.8 36.5 8.2 
Notes: 1. The employed comprise paid employees, the self-employed and unpaid 
family workers.  In the case of the sector figures, the denominator in the third and 
fourth columns is just paid employees.  2. Those in the army have been classified as 
unskilled, but the numbers involved are very small. 
Source: GUS Labour Force Survey data 2003-2007, second quarter. 
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NOTES 
 
1  Rapacki (2003) had previously estimated that the natural rate of Polish unemployment was around 
10%. 
 










where the term on the left hand side is a measure of living standards, the first time on right is a measure 
of labour productivity and the second term is a labour utilisation rate.  For a more comprehensive 
review of productivity and its measurement, see OECD (2001). 
3 In fact, while the total population decreased by about 400,000 between 1998 and 2003, that of people 
aged 15 and over and therefore eligible for inclusion in the LFS increased by almost one million. 
4 For example, every unemployed young person was to be offered training, retraining, work practice, a 
job or other employability measure before being out of work for six months (EC, 1997:6). 
5 See the Structural Indicators database at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu. 
6 See the labour market section of the theme ‘population and social conditions’ at 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu. 
7 Civil law contracts are effectively contracts of commission for one-off job assignments. 
8 Previously, no constraints had been applied, whether to the length of any single fixed-term 
assignment or to their successive number.  It must, of course, be recalled that, at the time the 1974 
Code was drawn up, the standard presumption was that employment contracts would be of indefinite 
duration. 
9 There were relatively minor relaxations of the regulations for permanent staff on sick leave, overtime, 
interrupted working time, daily breaks and time off for job search under the 2002 Labour Code reforms 
(Czarzasty, 2002).  However, these were insufficient to affect the assessment of the strictness of EPL 
for such workers by OECD (2004). 
10 Account needs to be taken of institutional features, such as the effectiveness of active labour market 
policy and the unemployment benefit regime, that might interact with the EPL framework before 
arriving at such empirical conclusions. 
11 The need to examine the differential impact of EPL on separate sub-groups within the labour market 
is a recurrent theme, reiterated more recently in, for example, Sa (2008), Siebert (2007) and Bassanini 
and Duval (2006). 
12 At the very least, it might be expected to induce at least some previously legal temporary work to 
gravitate toward the underground economy. Perhaps ironically, one of the aims of the 1996 and 
subsequent Polish Labour Code reforms was to introduce greater clarity into the law and to flush such 
employment into the open.  Tackling undeclared work has, of course, long been a target of the EES (E. 
Comm., 2007). 
13 Since 1999 the LFS has been based on continuous observation and 1/13
th of its quarterly sample of 
dwellings is surveyed each week.  Each quarterly sample covers around 17,000 households containing 
over 40,000 persons aged 15 and over. 